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Using  an  updated  version  of  the  CWS  model  (introduced  by  Eyckmans  and  Tulkens  in 
Resource  and  Energy  Economics  2003),  this  paper  intends  to  evaluate  with  numbers  the 
respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public 
goods model as customarily applied to the climate change problem. After a reminder of the 
model structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved – 
namely, core stability and internal-external stability, the former property is shown to hold for 
the grand coalition in the CWS model only if resource transfers of a specific form between 
countries are introduced. It is further shown that while the latter property holds neither for the 
grand coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that 
involves transfers (dubbed "potential internal stability") for most small coalitions. The reason 
for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing rationale that inspires the transfers 
in either case. Finally, it is shown that the stable coalitions that perform best (in terms of 
carbon concentration  and global welfare) always  are composed  of both industrialized  and 
developing countries. Two sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of all these results. 
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 1 Introduction
The global public good character of combating the e®ects of climate change requires vol-
untary cooperation amongst countries if any improvement upon the laissez faire business-
as-usual is sought for. Such cooperation, institutionalized in international environmental
treaties, consists in joint actions decided and implemented by the signatory countries. Ne-
gotiated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
the Kyoto Protocol represents the ¯rst legally binding agreement on climate. As such, it is
now considered as a decisive step. However it is widely acknowledged that, in order to be
environmentally e®ective, post-Kyoto agreements should include more countries and yield
stronger carbon emission abatement. This twin issue (which countries and how much more
abatement?) is at the heart of the on-going negotiation process that currently prepares,
under the UNFCCC, for the post 2012 world climate regime.
Calling a \coalition" any set of countries thus joining their e®orts against climate change,
an abundant literature has developed over the last 15 years dealing with the issue of the likeli-
ness of \stable" climate coalitions. In that literature, two stability concepts 1 are competing,
and an early summary of that competition was reported in Tulkens (1998) with an update
in Chander and Tulkens (2006). Up to then, the confrontation of the two notions has been
exclusively conceptual; leaving it to the reader to evaluate their respective merits.
In this paper we wish to make the comparison at another level, namely the one of applica-
tions with their implied policy relevance. For that purpose, we make use of a numerical inte-
grated assessment model, namely the ClimNeg World Simulation (henceforth CWS) model,
which lends itself to proceed fairly easily to the comparison we are interested in. Such a
numerical approach of the coalitional stability problem has been initiated in Eyckmans and
Tulkens (2003), who actually introduced the CWS model and used it to explore one of the
two conceptual theses just mentioned. This was followed and pursued in Carraro, Eyckmans
and Finus (2006), who explored with CWS the other thesis. By putting together these two
explorations with an updated version of the CWS model, the present paper presents an ex-
plicit comparison, with the purpose of bringing to light the properties of potential coalitions
in three respects: stability, climate performance and global welfare.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, it is methodological. By testing on
the same integrated assessment model the two alternative game theoretic stability concepts,
we better show their relative merits. Second, the paper contributes to the policy debate.
Assessing the properties of alternative climate coalitions in a concrete numerical context
gives a powerful justi¯cation for recommendations as to the size and nature (homogeneity vs
heterogeneity) of possible climate coalitions. Moreover, by showing explicitly which transfers
among countries are appropriate to stabilize e±cient coalitions, the paper also identi¯es wider
room for negotiation.
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 presents the reader
with the basic game theoretic concepts involved in the coalition stability notions we wish
1One of the two concepts is often assimilated with \self enforcement" (of treaties signed by members of
stable coalitions), as suggested initially by Barret (1994) and elaborated upon in Barret (2003). Actually,
this attractive expression applies equally well to both stability concepts. There is thus no gain in using it
here.
2to put to a test. Section 3 presents the CWS integrated assessment model, including the
updated exogenous data it makes use of by now. Section 4 contains the main numerical
results on the two alternative stability concepts when applied to the CWS model, and Sec-
tions 5 and 6 comment on the issues of homogeneity vs heterogeneity, aggregate welfare and
environmental performance of alternative coalitions in that model. Some sensitivity analyzes
are presented in Section 7 and the concluding Section 8 summarizes our main ¯ndings.
2 The conceptual framework
2.1 The climatic-economic model and its associated games
The methodology we are using requires to make precise the relationship between the economic
model (CWS) and the games from which the alternative stability concepts are borrowed. In
this section we deal with the game theoretic framework while the economic model will be
described in Section 3.
Two categories of games are involved, namely cooperative and non-cooperative ones. In
either case the players are the countries, each player's strategies are the values chosen for
the economic decision variables and the players payo®s are the countries' welfare level at the
end of that period. A family of n such strategies, one for each player, de¯nes what we call
in the following section ascenario. Among the many conceivable ones we shall deal with (i)
the Nash equilibrium scenario, (ii) various scenarios of partial agreement Nash equilibrium
with respect to given coalitions, and (iii) the Pareto e±cient scenario.
Non-cooperative games are those that consider strategies enacted by individual players;
they lead essentially to the Nash equilibrium concept. Cooperative games, by contrast,
typically consider in addition the strategies chosen jointly by groups of players, usually
called coalitions, that is, subsets of players (including singletons and the all players set). In
either case the behavioral assumption is made that the strategy chosen by individual players
as well as the strategies chosen jointly by coalitions result from payo® maximization over
some feasible set: the individual payo®s in the non-cooperative setting, the joint payo®s of
the coalition members in the cooperative setting, this joint payo® being called the worth of
the coalition.2
2.2 The stability concepts
2.2.1 \Gamma core" stability
In general, the core-stability theory focuses on strategies chosen jointly by the members
of the grand coalition, that is, the set N of all players. The behavioral assumption just
mentioned implies that, in the CWS model, N chooses the Pareto e±cient scenario.
This scenario and the grand coalition that generates it are then said to be stable in the
core sense if the scenario belongs to the core of a suitably de¯ned cooperative game, that is, if
2We deal only with transferable utility (TU) games, for two reasons. On the one hand, at the theoretical
level, the stability concepts we use have been developed for such games only; on the other hand, only TU
games are used in applied numerical works such as this one.
3it is such that (i) no individual player can reach a higher payo® by not adopting the strategy
assigned to him in the e±cient scenario and choosing instead the best individual strategy
he could ¯nd; and (ii) no subset of players, smaller than N, can similarly do better for its
members, that is, by rejecting the strategies assigned to them by the e±cient scenario and
adopting a strategy of their own. Consequently, the grand coalition N is called strategically
stable and its scenario may rightly be dubbed self enforceable since no coalition can ¯nd a
better one for its members.
Formally, let i refer to players (i = 1;:::;n), S µ N denote a coalition, let the scalar
W(S) be the worth of coalition S and the vector W = (W1;:::;Wi;:::;Wn) denote an
imputation3. The imputation W will be said to belong to the core of the cooperative game
if the individual payo®s Wi satisfy the following property:
² Property CR: Coalitional rationality 8S µ N;
P
i2S Wi ¸ W(S)
Notice that this property implies:
² Property IR: Individual rationality 8i 2 N; Wi ¸ W(fig)
To be complete, the formal statement of these two properties should further specify
what are the players' strategies implicit in the right hand sides of these expressions, namely
W(fig) and W(S). In the former, the strategy and the ensuing payo® of player i are those
of the Nash equilibrium scenario; in the latter, the worth of coalition S is the sum of the
payo®s obtained by the members of S as they result from enacting the joint strategy that
maximizes this sum; this is the scenario dubbed above partial agreement Nash equilibrium
(PANE) with respect to a coalition.4
2.2.2 Internal-external stability
Rather than focusing on strategies of the grand coalition, the internal-external stability
theory considers any coalition S and the payo®s of its members at the corresponding PANE
scenario5. It then considers the strategies and the resulting individual payo®s that can be
reached by every player along that scenario according to whether he is inside or outside of
the coalition6. Being inside means for the player to follow the strategy he is assigned to
within the coalition he is a member of, whereas being outside means behaving as a singleton,
taking as given the behavior of the coalition he is not a member of as well as of the other
players (assumed to behave as singletons too). A coalition S and the PANE scenario it
3An imputation is any vector of individual payo®s W such that their sum is equal to the worth of the
grand coalition, formally:
P
i2N Wi = W(N). By construction it is induced by an e±cient strategy.
4In a partial agreement Nash equilibrium with respect to a coalition, the coalition members are assumed,
as usual, to maximize their joint payo®s; but it is assumed in addition { and this is not usual { that the
players outside of the coalition choose, as singletons, the strategy that maximizes their individual payo®,
given what the coalition and the other singletons do. The equilibrium concept derived from this assumption
(called the \gamma" assumption) was introduced in Chander and Tulkens (1995) & (1997) as the essential
building block of the \gamma core" concept they proposed, which is to be used hereafter. A powerful further
justi¯cation of the assumption is provided in Chander (2003).
5Thus, the gamma assumption is used here too.
6It is assumed that a player can only either join the coalition or remain alone.
4generates are then said to be stable in the internal-external sense if the scenario is such that
no insider prefers to stay out of the coalition and no outsider prefers to join the coalition
rather than stay aside. Consequently, the coalition S is called stable and its PANE scenario
self enforceable, not by reference to alternative coalitions as in the preceding concept, but
instead because of the structure of the individual motivations of the players within and
outside the coalition.
Formally, letting Wi(S) denote the individual payo® of player i when coalition S is formed,
this means that the payo®s satisfy the following two properties 7:
² Property IS: Internal Stability 8i 2 S; Wi(S) ¸ Wi(Snfig)
² Property ES: External Stability 8i = 2 S; Wi(S) ¸ Wi(S [ fig)
2.3 Transfer schemes
It has often been suggested that when a coalition and its strategies are not stable, transfers
of payo®s (of economic goods, in economic games) between players may induce stability. To
what extent is this the case for each of the two forms of stability just de¯ned?
In the context of the core-stability theory, transfers were proposed by Chander and
Tulkens (1995, 1997) for the standard game with multilateral externalities used to deal with
international environmental agreements. They proved analytically that transfers formulated
as follows induce the stability property.
Let W Nash
i be the payo® of player i at the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game,







be the payo® vector of the players at the Pareto e±cient solution of the cooperative game.
















j ) i = 1;:::;n, (1)
with ¼i ¸ 0 8i such that
P
i ¼i = 1.
These transfers guarantee that each player receives a payo® at least equal to what it
is in case of no cooperation and it divides the surplus of cooperation over non-cooperation
according to weights ¼i. In the multilateral environmental model, each weight is equal to
the ratio of player i's marginal damage cost over the sum over all players of such marginal
damage costs. With these weights, the payo® vector8
W ¤(N) + ªN =def (W ¤
1 + ª1;:::;W ¤
n + ªn),
7The internal-external stability concept originates in the work of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) on the stability
of cartels and has been imported in the literature on IEAs by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett
(1994). The way it is presented here { in particular its connection with the PANE concept { owes much to
Eyckmans and Finus (2004).
8That W¤(N) + ªN is an imputation follows from the fact that (1) implies
P
i2N ªi = 0, i.e. the
transfers budget balances.
5is shown by Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) to belong to the core of the game.
The internal-external stability theory proposes no speci¯c transfer formula but introduces
instead the notion of potentially internally stable coalitions. A coalition (of any size) is
potentially internally stable if it can guarantee to all its members at least their free-rider
payo®. For a given a coalition, the free-rider payo® of any of its members is the payo® the
member would obtain in the PANE scenario w.r.t. that coalition if he would stay out and
behave as a singleton in the face of that coalition.
Formally, for any coalition S, this reads as follows:




The free rider payo® of a player i vis-µ a-vis some coalition S { that is, each term of the
sum in the right hand side of (2) { may be seen as the minimum payo® player i requires to
remain a member of the coalition. Coalitions whose worth under their PANE is large enough
to meet this requirement for all their members can thus be stabilized at least internally9.
The two approaches rest on di®erent views when applied to international environmental
agreements. The core-stability approach assumes that, if one or several countries attempt to
free-ride on an e±cient agreement with transfers, the other countries do not cooperate among
themselves anymore, so as to make the free rider see that the country is better o® by not
free riding. This threat is what induces stability. In the internal-external stability approach,
stability of an agreement within a coalition obtains if no individual country attempts to
free-ride on it, assuming that free riding does not prevent the other countries from keeping
cooperation among themselves.
3 The ClimNeg World Simulation model (CWS)
3.1 Overview of the model
The ClimNeg World Simulation model (CWS) is an integrated assessment model of climate
change and optimal growth, adapted for coalitional analysis from Nordhaus and Yang (1996).
It encompasses economic, climatic and impact dimensions in a worldwide intertemporal set-
ting. As a Ramsey-type model, growth is driven by population growth, technological change
and capital accumulation. The time dimension is discrete, indexed by t, ¯nite, but very
long. The world is split into six countries/regions: USA, Japan, Europe10, China, the For-
mer Soviet Union and the Rest of the World. In each country/region11 i = 1;:::;n gross
output is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function combining capital and population.
Population is exogenous. Capital accumulation comes from (endogenous) gross investment
less (exogenous) scrapping. Technical progress is Hicks-neutral. Carbon emissions stem
9By using the Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme introduced in Eyckmans and Finus (2004). \Sharing scheme"
indicates that the authors do not propose a particular solution but are interested instead in identifying a
class of sharing rules that stabilizes all PIS coalitions.
10Europe is de¯ned as EU-15.
11For short, we henceforth use only country.
6from global output with an emission coe±cient which can be reduced by national policies,
e ¾i;t = (1 ¡ ¹i;t)¾i;t, where ¹i;t 2 (0;1) stands for the carbon abatement rate and ¾i;t is the
exogenous carbon intensity of the economy. Abatement costs are given by an increasing and
convex cost function Ci(¹i;t). Carbon emissions accumulate in the atmosphere. Concen-
tration, through a simpli¯ed carbon cycle, yields a global mean temperature, expressed as
temperature change with respect to pre-industrial level, ¢Tt. The impacts of global warm-
ing in each country are considered through damage cost functions Di(¢Tt), increasing and
convex. Thus, consumption is given by the gross output minus investment, abatement costs
and damage costs, Zi;t = Yi;t ¡ Ii;t ¡ Ci(¹i;t) ¡ Di(¢Tt).
The welfare of each country is measured as the aggregate discounted consumption until
the end of the period.
The model is used to determine, over the period 2000-2300, paths of investment (Iit) and
emissions (through ¹it) over time and, consequently, capital accumulation, carbon concen-
tration, temperature change and ¯nally consumption, all at the world and country levels.
This economic model is converted into a a six players game by letting the six countries
be the six players, whose strategies are the decision variables Iit) and ¹it over the entire
period 2000-2300, and whose individual payo®s are their respective aggregate discounted
consumptions until the end of the period, as they result from capital accumulation, carbon
concentration and temperature change.
The players-countries strategies are speci¯ed according to three alternative scenarios.
First, the Nash equilibrium scenario12, which is the joint outcome of each country maximizing
its welfare taking the actions of the others as given. Second, the partial agreement Nash
equilibria with respect to a coalition scenarios 13, each of which is the outcome of a subset
of countries maximizing jointly their welfare, while the others act individually (there are
as many such scenarios considered as there are coalitions). And third, the Pareto e±cient
scenario where all countries act jointly so as to maximize the world welfare.
The dynamic optimization problems whose solutions are the numerical values of each one
of these scenatrios are stated in Table I in the appendix. Parameter values as well as initial
values are gathered there also. The justi¯cation for (exogenous) discount rates equal to 1.5%
in developed countries and 3.0% in developing ones is given in ET-03.14
Finally, transfers between countries are, as in ET-03, generalized GTT transfers, that is,
an extension by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997) to the present dynamic context of the
Chander and Tulkens (1995-1997) transfers mentioned above.
3.2 Data set and calibration
In this paper we use an updated version of the CWS model. For two main sets of assumptions,
time has revealed strong departing evolutions from what was expected a few years ago. These
12In the terminology of dynamic noncooperative games, this is an open loop Nash equilibrium. Closed
loop or feedback Nash equilibria have also been introduced in dynamic core-stability analysis in Germain,
Toint, Tulkens and de Zeeuw 2003, albeit with a simpler model. An extension to the CWS model is still
awaiting.
13These are of open loop nature as well
14The model runs under GAMS. All codes are available from the authors upon request.
7are population growth and technological progress. Table 1 in the appendix displays our
assumptions, previous ones (those used in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) { ET-03 hereafter)
and current ones. Some comments are given hereafter.
As far as population growth is concerned, the CWS model in ET-03 was using population
forecasts of Nordhaus and Yang (1996), which came from the United Nations. A positive
growth was expected in every region. Our update is based on the latest publications of
the United Nations, World Population to 2300 (2004) and World Population Prospects: The
2004 Revision (2005). At this horizon, world population is expected to reach 9 billion people,
1 billion less than the previous forecast. More important, the time pro¯les of various regions
become more contrasted. Europe, Japan and China face a peak in their population between
2020 and 2030, or even before, and then experience a decline. The population in the Former
Soviet Union is expected to decrease. In the USA, the population increase should be stronger
than expected, mainly because of immigration and fertility rates. In the Rest of the World,
short-term population growth would be stronger, but followed by a stronger slowdown. We
assume that, in each country population size converges to a steady state value in the long
run.
In the CWS model technological progress encompasses two elements, the global factor
productivity and the carbon intensity of economic activity. As far as the former is concerned,
high positive trends are expected for China and the USA, while lower progress would occur
in Japan, the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the Rest of the World (ROW). The most
striking update concerns carbon intensities which have exhibited contrasting patterns in the
recent years. Our data come from the International Energy Agency for carbon emissions and
from the World Bank for GDP15. Apparently, stringent industrial adjustments are in place
that could yield sharp decreases in carbon intensities. This is particularly true for China and
FSU. On the contrary, recent trends in Japan and ROW suggest lower carbon improvements
than expected. No major changes have been noticed for the EU and the USA in comparison
with the former version of CWS.
This update has two main consequences for climate issues. Firstly, world emissions are
lower in the business-as-usual scenario than they were in ET-03. But, secondly, heterogene-
ity among countries is reinforced: national emission pro¯les are lower in all countries, in
particular in China, while the USA experiences higher emissions. The implication of this is
that the relative weight of the di®erent countries in the global issue has signi¯cantly changed,
and so did the costs and bene¯ts of each country to participate to a given climate agreement.
As a consequence, these new economic patterns may have major implications on a country's
attitude towards climate negotiations, towards the coalitions they might form and on the
room for agreement16.
15In fact, we use the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool of the World Resources Institute that gathers data
from the International Energy Agency and the World Bank.
16A complete description of the update is provided in Gerard (2006, 2007).
84 Stability analysis of coalitions
We now apply the di®erent concepts of coalition stability to the numerical CWS model, in
both its original (CWS 1.1) and updated (CWS 1.2) versions. Given the six regions, 63
coalitions can possibly form, for each of which we compute its worth WS in the sense of
the gamma-characteristic function, that is, at a partial agreement Nash equilibrium of the
model. This is done according to formula (25)-(26) in ET-03.
4.1 Core-stability
Let us focus ¯rst on the results for the cooperative approach as they appear in Tables
2 and 3. In either table, the ¯rst column contains a six digit key specifying the struc-
ture of the coalition: if a region is a member of the coalition, it obtains a \1" at the
appropriate position in the key. For instance, the key \111111" refers to S = N =
fUSA;JPN;EU;CHN;FSU;ROWg. Column 2 contains the worth of a coalition (that
is the aggregate welfare of its members, W(S)) at its corresponding partial agreement Nash
equilibrium and column 3 contains the total of what members of each coalition get at the





Column 4 gives the di®erence between the values of the two previous columns. If this dif-
ference is negative, it means that S is worse o® in the grand coalition. Column 6 gives the
total amount of generalized GTT transfers for the coalition S (ªS =
P
i2S ªi).
Comparing the two tables reveals that:
1. Without transfers, the world e±cient allocation, which needs the grand coalition to
be achieved, is not core-stable: 14 smaller coalitions (out of 63) can improve upon it
in CWS 1.1 and 18 coalitions can do so in the updated version. Thus, in either case,
the grand coalition without transfers cannot form. Note that among the 18 blocking
coalitions in the update, 14 are all those that were blocking in CWS 1.1.
2. With transfers, the world e±cient allocation is core-stable in either case. In CWS
1.2, the amount of the transfers is in general smaller except for the USA. This last
result is in line with the two main consequences of the update as presented before: less
emissions in every region (the extent of the externality is reduced) except in the USA.
The ¯rst result is especially important, as it con¯rms with two versions of the CWS
model the possibility of achieving core stability of the world e±cient allocation, thanks to
GTT transfers. The concept thus appears as robust to updating. The presence of four newly
blocking coalitions may be seen as revealing an increased instability of the e±cient allocation
without transfers. But this makes the transfers all the more necessary if e±ciency is being
sought in the international agreement.
9Table 2: Coalitions payoffs at all PANE w.r.t. a coalition (WS
S) and at EFF (WS
*); 
generalized GTT transfers (?S) (billion 1990 US$): Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) 
key  W(S)   WS
*  WS
*–W(S)  (%)  ? S  WS
*+? S   WS
*+? S –W(S)  (%) 
Coalitions of 1 country 
100000  78353  78986  633  0.808  -282  78704  351  0,448 
010000  42909  43222  313  0.729  -121  43102  192  0,448 
001000  102731  103650  919  0,895  -423  103226  496  0,482 
000100  9141  8862  -279  -3.057  333  9195  54  0,591 
000010  23794  24025  231  0,969  -123  23902  108  0,452 
000001  81137  81093  -44  -0,054  616  81709  572  0,705 
Coalitions of 2 countries 
110000  121264  122208  945  0,779  -403  121806  542  0.447 
101000  181090  182636  1546  0,854  -706  181930  841  0,464 
100100  87535  87848  312  0,357  51  87899  364  0,416 
100010  102151  103011  860  0,842  -405  102605  455  0,445 
100001  159829  160079  250  0,156  334  160413  584  0,365 
011000  145642  146872  1230  0,845  -544  146328  686  0,471 
010100  52062  52084  22  0,043  213  52297  235  0,451 
010010  66705  67247  542  0,813  -244  67003  299  0,448 
010001  124262  124315  53  0,043  495  124511  548  0,441 
001100  111946  112511  566  0,505  -90  112421  476  0,425 
001010  126531  127674  1143  0,903  -546  127128  597  0,471 
001001  184315  184743  427  0,232  192  184935  620  0,336 
000110  32944  32886  -58  -0,175  210  33097  153  0,463 
000101  90467  89955  -512  -0,566  949  90904  437  0,483 
000011  105134  105118  -17  -0,016  493  105610  476  0,453 
Coalitions of 3 countries 
111000  224007  225858  1851  0,826  -826  225032  1024  0,457 
110100  130486  131070  584  0,448  -69  131001  515  0,394 
110010  145067  146233  1166  0,804  -526  145707  641  0,442 
110001  202879  203301  422  0,208  213  203514  635  0,313 
101100  190415  191497  1083  0,569  -372  191125  711  0,373 
101010  204903  206660  1757  0,857  -829  205832  928  0,453 
101001  263009  263729  719  0,274  -90  263639  630  0,239 
100110  111367  111872  505  0,453  -72  111800  433  0,389 
100101  169139  168941  -199  -0,117  667  169608  468  0,277 
100011  183752  184103  352  0,191  211  184314  562  0,306 
011100  154905  155734  829  0,535  --211  155523  618  0,399 
011010  169448  170897  1448  0,855  -667  170230  781  0,461 
011001  227376  227965  589  0,259  72  228037  661  0,291 
010110  75880  76109  229  0,301  90  76198  318  0,420 
010101  133513  133177  -336  -0,252  829  134006  492  0,369 
010011  148160  148340  180  0,121  372  148712  552  0,372 
001110  135788  136536  748  0,551  -213  136323  535  0,394 
001101  193681  193604  -76  -0,039  526  194130  450  0,232 
001011  208255  208767  512  0,246  69  208837  582  0,279 
000111  114376  113979  -397  -0,347  826  114805  429  0,375 
Coalitions of 4 countries 
111100  233398  234720  1322  0,566  -493  234227  829  0,355 
111010  247830  249883  2053  0,828  -949  248933  1104  0,445 
111001  306113  306951  838  0,274  -210  306741  628  0,205 
110110  154332  155095  763  0,494  -192  154902  571  0,370 
110101  212255  212163  -92  -0,043  546  212710  454  0,214 
110011  226825  227326  501  0,221  90  227416  591  0,261 
101110  214285  215522  1237  0,577  -495  215027  741  0,346 
101101  272543  272590  48  0,018  244  272834  292  0,107 
101011  286996  287753  757  0,264  -213  287540  544  0,190 
100111  193119  192965  -154  -0,080  544  193509  390  0,202 
011110  178761  179758  998  0,558  -334  179425  664  0,372 
011101  236817  236827  10  0,004  405  237232  415  0,175 
011011  251338  251990  652  0,259  -51  251938  600  0,239 
010111  157457  157202  -255  -0,162  706  157907  451  0,286 
001111  217685  217629  -57  -0,026  403  218032  346  0,159 
Coalitions of 5 countries 
111110  257284  258744  1461  0,568  -616  258129  845  0,328 
111101  315738  315813  75  0,024  123  315936  198  0,063 
111011  330123  330976  853  0,258  -333  330642  519  0,157 
110111  236267  236188  -79  -0,033  423  236611  344  0,146 
101111  296612  296615  3  0,001  121  296736  124  0,042 
011111  260851  260851  1  0,000  282  261134  283  0,108 
Coalitions of 6 countries 
111111  339837  339837  0  0.000  0  339837  0  0.000 Table 3: Coalitions payoffs at all PANE w.r.t. a coalition (WS
S) and at EFF (WS
*); 
generalized GTT transfers (? S) (billion 1990 US$): This version 
key  W(S)   WS
*  WS
*–W(S)  (%)  ? S  WS
*+? S   WS
*+? S –W(S)  (%) 
Coalitions of 1 country 
100000  148266  148946  680  0,459  -312  148633  368  0,248 
010000  30645  30755  110  0,359  -42  30714  68  0,222 
001000  108413  108886  473  0,437  -209  108677  265  0,244 
000100  36156  36064  -92  -0,256  196  36260  104  0,288 
000010  9745  9790  44  0,454  -23  9766  21  0,217 
000001  52326  52107  -219  -0,419  389  52496  170  0,325 
Coalitions of 2 countries 
110000  178914  179701  787  0,440  -354  179347  433  0,242 
101000  256690  257832  1141  0,445  -521  257311  621  0,242 
100100  184488  185009  521  0,283  -116  184893  406  0,220 
100010  158016  158735  720  0,455  -335  158400  384  0,243 
100001  200852  201052  200  0,100  77  201130  277  0,138 
011000  139059  139641  582  0,418  -84  139558  498  0,358 
010100  66804  66819  15  0,023  155  66973  170  0,254 
010010  40391  40544  154  0,381  -65  40480  89  0,220 
010001  83016  82862  -154  -0,185  348  83210  194  0,233 
001100  144602  144949  348  0,240  -12  144937  335  0,232 
001010  118160  118675  515  0,436  -232  118444  283  0,240 
001001  160901  160993  92  0,057  181  161173  273  0,170 
000110  45902  45853  -49  -0,107  173  46026  124  0,271 
000101  88532  88170  -362  -0,409  586  88756  224  0,253 
000011  62103  61896  -207  -0,333  366  62263  160  0,257 
Coalitions of 3 countries 
111000  287346  288587  1241  0,432  -563  288024  679  0,236 
110100  215156  215764  608  0,283  -158  215607  451  0,209 
110010  188665  189490  825  0,438  -377  189113  448  0,238 
110001  231556  231808  251  0,109  35  231843  287  0,124 
101100  293010  293895  885  0,302  -324  293571  560  0,191 
101010  266446  267621  1175  0,441  -544  267077  631  0,237 
101001  309540  309938  398  0,129  -132  309807  267  0,086 
100110  194248  194799  551  0,284  -139  194660  412  0,212 
100101  237156  237116  -40  -0,017  274  237389  234  0,098 
100011  210630  210842  212  0,101  54  210896  266  0,126 
011100  175264  175705  440  0,251  -54  175651  386  0,220 
011010  148808  149431  623  0,418  -274  149157  349  0,235 
011001  191595  191748  153  0,080  139  191887  292  0,152 
010110  76553  76609  56  0,073  132  76740  187  0,245 
010101  119214  118926  -289  -0,242  544  119469  255  0,214 
010011  92776  92652  -125  -0,134  324  92976  200  0,216 
001110  154358  154739  381  0,247  -35  154704  346  0,224 
001101  197157  197057  -101  -0,051  377  197433  276  0,140 
001011  170672  170782  110  0,065  158  170940  268  0,157 
000111  98294  97960  -334  -0,340  563  98522  228  0,232 
Coalitions of 4 countries 
111100  323695  324650  956  0,295  -366  324284  590  0,182 
111010  297104  298376  1272  0,428  -586  297791  687  0,231 
111001  340268  340694  426  0,125  -173  340520  253  0,074 
110110  224919  225554  635  0,282  -181  225373  454  0,202 
110101  267888  267871  -17  -0,006  232  268103  215  0,080 
110011  241338  241597  259  0,107  12  241609  271  0,112 
101110  302782  303685  903  0,298  -348  303337  555  0,183 
101101  345972  346002  30  0,009  65  346067  95  0,028 
101011  319333  319728  395  0,124  -155  319573  240  0,075 
100111  246948  246905  -43  -0,017  250  247156  208  0,084 
011110  185022  185494  472  0,255  -77  185417  395  0,213 
011101  227875  227812  -64  -0,028  335  228147  272  0,119 
011011  201370  201538  168  0,083  116  201653  283  0,141 
010111  128982  128715  -267  -0,207  521  129236  254  0,197 
001111  206940  206846  -94  -0,046  354  207200  260  0,125 
Coalitions of 5 countries 
111110  333468  334440  971  0,291  -389  334051  582  0,175 
111101  376733  376757  24  0,006  23  376780  47  0,012 
111011  350063  350483  420  0,120  -196  350287  223  0,064 
110111  277685  277661  -25  -0,009  209  277869  184  0,066 
101111  355782  355791  9  0,003  42  355833  51  0,014 
011111  237663  237601  -62  -0,026  312  237913  251  0,105 
Coalitions of 6 countries 
111111  386547  386547  0  0.000  0  386547  0  0.000 4.2 Internal-external stability
Table 4 (next page) presents the results for the non-cooperative approach. The columns refer,
for the various coalitions, to the three di®erent stability properties (internal (IS), external
(ES), and potential internal (PIS)) proposed by this approach. A cross in a column means
that the property is satis¯ed for the corresponding coalition. We summarize the results as
follows, distinguishing again between without and with transfers cases:
² Internal and external stability: In both CWS 1.1 and CWS 1.2, very few coalitions
pass the IS test (8 or 7 of them, out of 5717). In particular, the grand coalition, that
is, the one that would achieve the world e±cient allocation without transfers, does not
pass it. More coalitions (11, or 15, out of 56 { the grand coalition is irrelevant here)
pass the ES test. No coalition passes both tests however, except for one, namely the
couple USA, EU which does so only in CWS 1.2.
² Potential internal stability: Contrary to the IS and ES tests, the PIS test is one that
implicitly refers to transfers within the coalitions, with the purpose of inducing internal
stability. Here again, the grand coalition does not pass the test, but many smaller
coalitions do in both CWS 1.1 and 1.2. More precisely, all of the ¯ve-country coalitions,
5 out of the 15 four-country coalitions and 2 out of the three-country coalitions did not
pass the test in CWS 1.1. In the update, 4 ¯ve-country coalitions and 5 four-country
coalitions do not pass the test whereas 1 ¯ve-country and all other coalitions of four
countries or less do pass it, as revealed by Table 6.
4.3 Core and internal-external stability compared
Considering the grand coalition N, we can report the following three results:
1. Without transfers, the world e±cient allocation, that only the grand coalition can
achieve, is lacking stability in both the core sense and the internal-external sense when
computed with the CWS model.
2. By contrast, if transfers are introduced, the world e±cient allocation achieved by N can
be stabilized in the core sense, by means of GTT transfers within the grand coalition.
3. This is not possible in the internal-external sense, however, by means of PIS transfers.
The reason for this di®erence is in the logic that lies behind the two stability concepts:
in the core case, stability of N is obtained from threatening the objecting parties to be
deprived of any part in the surplus generated by the collective move to e±ciency. In the
internal-external stability case, stability should result from o®ering each country its free rider
payo®; but it occurs that the surplus generated by the move to e±ciency is insu±cient for
ensuring that to all countries. This is due to the structure of the economic model, not to
the internal-external stability concept itself.
17Here we exclude singletons.
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  Carraro, Eyckmans and 
Finus (2006)  This version 
Coalition  IS  ES  PIS  IS           ES  PIS 
Coalitions of 2 countries 
USA,JPN  X    X      X 
USA,EU    X  X  X  X  X 
USA,CHN      X      X 
USA,FSU      X      X 
USA,ROW  X    X      X 
JPN,EU    X  X      X 
JPN,CHN      X      X 
JPN,FSU      X      X 
JPN,ROW  X    X  X    X 
EU,CHN      X      X 
EU,FSU      X      X 
EU,ROW  X    X      X 
CHN,FSU      X  X    X 
CHN,ROW      X  X    X 
FSU,ROW  X    X  X    X 
Coalitions of 3 countries 
USA,JPN,EU    X  X    X  X 
USA,JPN,CHN      X      X 
USA,JPN,FSU      X      X 
USA,JPN,ROW  X    X      X 
USA,EU,CHN          X  X 
USA,EU,FSU    X  X    X  X 
USA,EU,ROW       X    X  X 
USA,CHN,FSU      X      X 
USA,CHN,ROW      X      X 
USA,FSU,ROW  X    X      X 
JPN,EU,CHN      X      X 
JPN,EU,FSU    X  X      X 
JPN,EU,ROW       X      X 
JPN,CHN,FSU            X 
JPN,CHN,ROW      X      X 
JPN,FSU,ROW  X    X  X    X 
EU,CHN,FSU      X      X 
EU,CHN,ROW       X      X 
EU,FSU,ROW       X      X 
CHN,FSU,ROW      X  X    X 
Coalitions of 4 countries 
USA,JPN,EU,CHN    X      X   
USA,JPN,EU,FSU    X      X  X 
USA,JPN,EU,ROW    X  X    X   
USA,JPN,CHN,FSU            X 
USA,JPN,CHN,ROW       X      X 
USA,JPN,FSU,ROW      X      X 
USA,EU,CHN,FSU          X   
USA,EU,CHN,ROW      X    X   
USA,EU,FSU,ROW      X    X   
USA,CHN,FSU,ROW       X      X 
JPN,EU,CHN,FSU            X 
JPN,EU,CHN,ROW      X      X 
JPN,EU,FSU,ROW      X      X 
JPN,CHN,FSU,ROW      X      X 
EU,CHN,FSU,ROW      X      X 
Coalitions of 5 countries 
USA,JPN,EU,CHN,FSU    X      X   
USA,JPN,EU,CHN,ROW    X      X   
USA,JPN,EU,FSU,ROW    X      X   
USA,JPN,CHN,FSU,ROW            X 
USA,EU,CHN,FSU,ROW          X   
JPN,EU,CHN,FSU,ROW             
Coalitions of 6 countries 
Grand coalition    irrelevant      irrelevant   
 
IS = Internal Stability, ES = External Stability, PIS = Potential Internal Stability. 
“x” means that the property is satisfied for the coalition. As far as coalitions other than N are concerned, none of them can evidently be stable in
the core sense because it is precisely the meaning of the core result that N with transfers
can improve upon any of them. Concerning their stability in the internal-external stability
sense, one ¯nds in Tables 2 (or 3) and 4 hardly any correlation between those coalitions that
meet either internal or external stability (coalitions with an 'x' in the IS or ES columns
of Table 4) and those which could block in the core sense the e±cient allocation without
transfers (coalitions with a negative sign in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3). In short, this is
because the reasons for blocking (which are, for the members of S, the hope to do better by
themselves) are fundamentally di®erent from those for free riding (which are the search for
bene¯t from the others' actions). This last argument also explains why the PIS property
prevails better with small coalitions: vis-µ a-vis a small coalition, there is little to free ride
about (because the coalition does not achieve much), so that the surplus generated can be
su±cient to deter from such behavior.
In summary, the core vs internal-external stability concepts have quite opposing proper-
ties, not only as to the grand coalition, N, but also for smaller ones. One concept excludes
small coalitions, whereas the other concept can be found to be satis¯ed with small coalitions.
5 Stability vs performance
Can policy implications be derived from the above stability discussion and simulation re-
sults? In particular, how important are the coalitional stability properties we have identi¯ed?
Should they serve as an argument to support or advocate speci¯c structures for climatic inter-
national agreements such as small coalitions rather than large ones, or homogeneous rather
than heterogeneous ones?
To answer these questions, let us consider two criteria measuring the global outcome
resulting from an agreement, that is,
² the aggregate welfare level reached at the world level,
² the environmental performance achieved, expressed by atmospheric carbon concentra-
tion.
and consider how these are met by alternative coalition structures. This is done in Figure
1 with the numerical results of CWS 1.2. On the two axes, we use a welfare and an envi-
ronmental index respectively, that we borrow from CEF-06. Both indexes give the value 1
to the world e±cient allocation (the grand coalition case) that produces the highest aggre-
gate welfare and the lowest carbon concentrations, and the value 0 to the non-cooperative
Nash case, that depicts the lowest aggregate welfare and the highest carbon concentrations.
Formally, the indexes are computed as follows:

















i2N Wi(S) and M2300(S) are respectively the aggregate welfare and carbon con-
centration levels in 2300 under the corresponding coalition structure S, while \*" refers to the
world e±cient allocation (full cooperation) and \Nash" refers to the Nash case (no coopera-
tion). An increasing relation is obtained with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (lowest
global welfare, highest carbon concentration) at the bottom left and the grand coalition
(highest global welfare, lowest carbon concentration) at the top right.
Remembering that internal stability in its potential form prevails with small coalitions
while core-stability is ach¶ aieved only with the largest one, the relation also depicts both the
welfare and the environmental performances of alternative coalition sizes.
Clearly, accepting or recommending small coalition arrangements because of their poten-
tial internal stability virtues entails a loss on both counts, that striving for an e±cient and
core stable alternative could avoid. Internal stability thus appears to be a weakly desirable
objective.
6 Is coalition homogeneity desirable?
A common argument in the climate policy debate is that developed countries should engage
themselves ¯rst, after what developing countries would be invited to join the agreement and
participate to the mitigation of global warming. Although this argument seems reasonable
on the basis of historical responsibilities18, one may question its e®ectiveness. In this section
we analyze the how the composition of a coalition, that is, its degree of homogeneity, which
is to be de¯ned), a®ects its stability.
The regions/countries considered in the CWS model can be split into two categories:
² developed-Annex B countries (USA, EU and JPN), with high per capita emissions and
GDP,
² developing-non-Annex B countries (CHN and ROW), with low per capita emissions
and GDP, and low-cost abatement opportunities.
In the following we will talk about an heterogeneous coalition when a coalition is formed
by countries coming from more than a single category. Conversely, an homogeneous coalition
will designate a coalition formed by countries from a single category. The FSU will move as a
free electron in this categorization as it o®ers the characteristics of both a developed country
(high emissions per capita) and a developing one (low cost abatement opportunities, low
GDP per capita). Accordingly, our 57 coalitions (excluding singletons) are broken down into
42 heterogeneous coalitions and 15 homogeneous ones. We examine the relation mentioned
above, successively without and with transfers
18This is the principle of common but di®erentiated responsibilities of countries enounced in the UN
Framework Convention.
15Figure 1: Global outcome (aggregate welfare and the environment) with alternative coalition structures  



























xIn the no transfer case, there appears to be more homogeneous stable coalitions after the
update and less heterogeneous stable coalitions. Indeed on the one hand, in CWS 1.1 only 2
out of the 8 internally stable coalitions are homogeneous coalitions. With CWS 1.2, all the 4
homogeneous coalitions involving FSU and developing-non-Annex B countries pass now the
IS test and the coalition fUSA, EUg becomes both internally and externally stable.
On the other hand, in CWS 1.1, 6 of the 8 internally stable coalitions were heterogeneous
coalitions(out of 42). With the update, two of these 6 heterogeneous coalitions still pass
the IS test but those coalitions include only JPN as developed-Annex B country, which is
the least important emitter of the six regions in both versions19. Moreover, in CWS 1.1, 4
coalitions involving at least one of the two main polluters in each category, that is, (USA or
EU) and (CHN or ROW) passed the IS test. With the update, none of these coalitions passes
this test anymore20. So, less heterogeneous coalitions are stable in the IS-ES sense after the
update. In the same vein, ¯nally, the grand coalition, clearly the largest heterogeneous one,
is never core-stable without transfers in either version, with four more blocking coalitions
after the update.
When the possibility of transfers is introduced, stability appears also to be enhanced by
homogeneity after the update. In CWS 1.1, only 1 out of the 15 homogeneous coalitions
did not pass the PIS test. That coalition, the Annex B coalition fUSA, JPN, EU, FSUg21,
does satisfy the PIS property with the update. So it seems that there is more room for
cooperation between these countries today than ten years earlier. Furthermore, with the
update the Annex B coalition turns out to be more stable than the \Annex B without
the USA" coalition22. Indeed, this latter coalition does not satisfy the ES property (the
property was satis¯ed with CWS 1.1). This means that the United States would be better
o® by coming back to the Annex B coalition.
In CWS 1.1, 13 heterogeneous coalitions were not stable in the PIS sense. In CWS 1.2,
this ¯gure is only 11 but the composition of these coalitions has changed to some extent.
Indeed, no four-country (or more) coalitions involving both the USA and the EU and at
least one non-Annex B countries pass the PIS test after the update.
Homogeneity vs heterogeneity can also be analyzed by Figure 1. One can see that
the best (in terms of global welfare) homogeneous coalition, namely fCHN, FSU, ROWg,
leads to far lower global welfare and far higher carbon concentrations than both the best
heterogeneous coalition (the grand coalition) and the best heterogeneous coalition satisfying
the PIS property, that is, fUSA, JPN, CHN, FSU, ROWg. As a consequence, promoting
homogeneous coalitions would lead to very low mitigation policies at the world level, unable
to tackle climate change issue as heterogeneous (larger) coalitions could do.
Finally, there seems to be a trade-o® between stability and environmental e®ectiveness.
Homogeneity in climate coalitions fosters stability but is detrimental to climate e®ectiveness.
19JPN is less important in terms of emissions than USA or EU and even more with the update. In CWS
1.1, JPN emission share in the emissions of its category evolves as follow: 12% in 2000, 14% in 2050 and
12% in 2200. In CSW 1.2, those ¯gures are: 12% in 2000, 8% in 2050 and 6% in 2200.
20Moreover, in both versions, none of the coalitions that involve the two main emitters of a category and
at least one emitter of the other category is internally stable.
21The so-called Old Kyoto coalition in CEF-06.
22The so-called Present Kyoto coalition in CEF-06.
177 Sensitivity analyses
The objective of this section is to test to what extent our results are robust to the choice of
some key parameters. Extensive sensitivity analyses have revealed that two assumptions may
be key (Gerard, 2006). The ¯rst one is the evolution of carbon intensity (¾i;t in equations of
Table I) in China in the forthcoming years, and the second one is the slope of the damage
functions in all countries.
China is expected to become the world largest carbon emitter soon, but when heavily
depends on the assumption made on technological progress. In our model, carbon intensity
and total factor productivity are calibrated and projected on the basis of past pro¯les,
which yields a quite rapid { and optimistic { decarbonization of the Chinese economy in the
forthcoming decades. As a ¯rst sensitivity analysis, we reduced the rate of decarbonization
by half, while keeping the asymptotical value unchanged. This raises Chinese emissions by
60% in the business-as-usual scenario in 2100 while the level of emissions in the very long-
term is kept unchanged. The fact that Chinese emissions are higher increases the climate
externality generated (the e®ect of its own strategy on the other countries) and therefore the
possible gain from cooperation. However, the free-riding incentive may also be stronger for
the other countries in the coalitions including China because these coalitions will internalize
a larger part of the global externality. Both e®ects potentially raise concern for stability.
The model shows that the gain in world welfare between the Nash equilibrium and the
e±cient scenarios is slightly increased by around 1%. Our main results on the core-stability of
the grand coalition and the best PIS coalition (which includes China) still prevail. The e®ect
on the stability of coalitions without China is negative: the di®erence between the aggregate
welfare of the coalition and the sum of the free-riding claims of its members (de¯nition of the
PIS property) decreases for 23 out of the 26 coalitions considered; indeed, such coalitions
internalize a smaller part of the externality. However, the e®ect on the coalitions including
China is less clear: it increases for 16 out of 31 coalitions, but decreases for 18. In short, the
model con¯rms the mechanisms at stake in this test and our main conclusions remain valid.
The surprise may be that the e®ect on global welfare gain from cooperation is quite low.
The second sensitivity analysis concerns the damage functions. These, still borrowed
from Nordhaus and Yang (1996), bear major uncertainties. The relationship between global
temperature increase and climatic impacts is highly di±cult to quantify, and the most recent
studies (including the Stern Review and the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report) seem to
suggest higher damage sensitivity. We did this by increasing the exponent of the damage
functions (µi;2 in equations of Table I) by 50% in all countries. Intuitively, this will reinforce
the climate externality, and thus the desirability of cooperation. But, it is di±cult to infer,
a priori, the implication for stability because the free-riding incentive may also be stronger
when the coalitions try to better internalize the climate externality.
After computation the CWS model con¯rms that the gain in global welfare associated
with cooperation is stronger, and this time the increase is signi¯cant (the gain is three times
higher). However, even with such a strong incentive for cooperation, our main results on
core-stability of the grand coalition and the best PIS coalition remain valid. This means that
the stronger gain from cooperation dominates the reinforcement of the free-riding incentives.
No clear conclusion can be drawn about the impact on the stability of the other coalitions.
18Indeed, the di®erence between the aggregate welfare of the coalition and the sum of the
free-riding claims of its members increases for 38 out of 57 coalitions, but decreases for 19
others, making 6 coalitions no more PIS. The increase concerns mainly small coalitions, for
which we have already mentioned that there is less to free-ride about.
8 Conclusion
In the context of international climate agreements, two game theoretic approaches discuss
the stability of climate coalitions, using di®erent stability concepts. With the CWS model
(recently updated), this paper numerically compares and contrasts the results obtained from
either approaches. It turns out that transfers are required to ensure the stability of most
coalitions whatever the concept used. But transfers are not equally successful to stabilize
coalitions in both approaches because of the logic that lies behind the two concepts. More
precisely, if transfers can make the grand coalition stable in the gamma-core sense, it is never
the case in the internal-external sense; only smaller coalitions, where there is less to free-ride
about, are found stable in this sense, with transfers. Moreover we note that homogeneity
among the members of a coalition appears to help the potential internal stability of a coali-
tion. But the global outcome in terms of aggregate welfare or environmental performance as
reached by small or homogeneous coalitions is far less attractive compared with the hetero-
geneous world e±cient allocation. Thus, according to our simulations, promoting small or
homogeneous coalitions for internal stability purposes is not a desirable recommendation.
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Carbon intensity of GDP 
(kgC/1990 US$) 
Total factor productivity  
(index) 
 
ET-03  This version  ET-03  This version  ET-03  This version 
 
 
2020  2100  2020  2100  2020  2100  2020  2100  2020  2100  2020  2100 
 
USA  280.6  294.3  338.4  454.1  0.178  0.117  0.167  0.112  11.15  19.53  12.38  23.35 
JPN  124.5  124.5  126.6  111.6  0.075  0.062  0.088  0.069  13.91  23.97  10.69  16.95 
EU  403.3  427.0  391.1  377.0  0.094  0.073  0.086  0.071  10.23  18.50  10.43  19.31 
CHN  1431.7  1655.8  1395.7  1272.5  1.181  0.499  0.524  0.153  0.90  4.66  2.04  13.55 
FSU  332.5  366.3  276.2  244.8  0.773  0.318  0.706  0.228  2.35  7.49  1.74  4.40 
ROW  4713.7  6737.9  4914.7  6389.4  0.285  0.176  0.290  0.197  2.37  7.36  1.66  3.73 Table I: Equation listing of the CWS model (for a country i) 
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 Table II: List of variables 
Yi,t  Production (billions 1990 US$) 
Ai,t  Productivity  
Zi,t  Consumption (billions 1990 US$) 
Ii,t  Investment (billions 1990 US$) 
Ki,t  Capital stock (billions 1990 US$) 
Li,t  Population (million people) 
Ci,t  Cost of abatement (billions 1990 US$) 
Di,t  Damage from climate change (billions 1990 US$) 
Ei,t  Carbon emissions (billions tons of C) 
si,t  Carbon intensity of GDP (kgC/1990 US$) 
µi,t  Carbon emission abatement rate 
Mt  Atmospheric carbon concentration (billions tons of C) 
Ft  Radiative forcing (Watt per m²) 
?T t  Temperature increase atmosphere (°C) 
Tt
o  Temperature increase deep ocean (°C) 
Wi  Welfare (billions 1990 US$) 
 
Table III: Global parameter values 
dK   Capital depreciation rate  0.10 
?  Capital productivity parameter  0.25 
ß  Airborne fraction of carbon emissions  0.64 
dM  Atmospheric carbon removal rate  0.08333 
t1  Parameter temperature relationship  0.226 
t2  Parameter temperature relationship  0.44 
t3  Parameter temperature relationship  0.02 
?  Feedback parameter  1.41 
M  
Pre-industrial carbon concentration  590 
M0  Initial carbon concentration in 2000  783
a 
?T 0  Initial temperature change atmosphere in 2000  0.622
b 
T0
o  Initial temperature change deep ocean in 2000  0.108
c 
 
a Initial carbon concentration in 1990 (ET -03) was 750 billions tons of C. 
b Initial temperature change atmosphere in 1990 (ET-03) was 0.5°C. 
c Initial temperature change deep ocean in 1990 (ET-03) was 0.10°C. Table IV: Regional parameter values 
  ?i,1   ?i,2  bi,1  bi,2  ?i 
  Damage function  Abatement cost function  Discount rate 
USA  0.01102  2.0  0.07  2.887  0.015 
JPN  0.01174  2.0  0.05  2.887  0.015 
EU  0.01174  2.0  0.05  2.887  0.015 
CHN  0.01523  2.0  0.15  2.887  0.030 
FSU  0.00857  2.0  0.15  2.887  0.015 
ROW  0.02093  2.0  0.10  2.887  0.030 
Table V: 2000 reference year variables 
  Yi,0  (%)  Ki,0  (%)  L i,0  (%)  E i,0  (%) 
USA  7563.8099  27.45  19740.6885  27.97  282.224  4.66  1.5738  24.01 
JPN  3387.9305  12.29  9753.9695  13.82  126.870  2.10  0.3295  5.03 
EU  8446.9010  30.65  22804.4771  32.31  377.136  6.23  0.8875  13.54 
CHN  968.9064  3.52  2686.0563  3.81  1262.645  20.86  0.9468  14.44 
FSU  558.4360  2.03  1490.0376  2.11  287.893  4.76  0.6258  9.55 
ROW  6633.4274  24.07  14105.2089  19.98  3715.663  61.39  2.1918  33.44 
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Table VI: 1990 reference year variables (ET-03) 
  Yi,0  (%)  Ki,0  (%)  L i,0  (%)  Ei,0  (%) 
USA  5464.796  25.9  14262.510  26.3  250.372  4.8  1.360  22.8 
JPN  2932.055  13.9  8442.250  15.6  123.537  2.4  0.292  4.9 
EU  6828.042  32.4  18435.710  34.0  366.497  7.0  0.872  14.6 
CHN  370.024  1.8  1025.790  1.9  1133.683  21.5  0.669  11.2 
FSU  855.207  4.1  2281.900  4.2  289.324  5.5  1.066  17.9 
ROW  4628.621  22.0  9842.220  18.1  3102.689  58.9  1.700  28.5 
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